Home | About Us | Program Areas | Publications | Interviews | Articles & Communiques | Annual Conference | Contact Us ...
Centre for The Development of Civil Society
...  

Articles

Anti-Graft War in Nigeria: An Agenda for Civil Society.
Dr. H. Assis Asobie
President, Transparency in Nigeria TIN.

December 9 2004, TIN in collaboration with the Global Rights and the Convention on Business Integrity marked the UN Day on Anti-Corruption with a symposium on: “The State of the Fight against Corruption in Nigeria Today”. Assisi Asobie used the opportunity to respond to a Nigeria Government that holds the view that TI Corruption Perception Index is anti Nigeria. He also used the opportunity to set agenda for civil society. The following are excerpts from his presentation at the event.

An Assessment of the Fight Against Corruption in Nigeria, 1999-2004.
To encourage reform and point out the right direction, TI conducts a number of surveys. Two of these surveys are very popular yet widely misinterpreted and misunderstood. They are the Corruption Perception Index (measuring perception about bribe takers) and the Bribe Payers Index. We shall carefully explain the nature of these surveys and what really they are meant to measure.

Political leaders, public officers, the private sector and non-governmental organizations have spent a lot of time, energy and resources in trying to eradicate the deadly disease of corruption in Nigeria since 1999; but the efforts have yielded little results. This is evident in the outcome of a number of surveys conducted by various organizations. We may begin with the Corruption Perception Index of TI. Table 1 below, presents the result of the surveys for Nigerian, between 1999 and 2004.

Table 1. Nigeria’s Position on the CPI, 1999-2004

Year CPI scale No. of states sampled No. of surveys CPI Score
1999 10-0 99 5 1.6
2000 10-0 n.a 4 1.2
2001 10-0 91 4 1.0
2002 10-0 n.a 6 1.6
2003 10-0 133 9 1.4
2004 10-0 146 9 1.6

Source: Research conducted by a Ph.D. student of the University of Nigeria, Nsukka, Mr. Malachy Eze, in 2004, based on data obtained from http:www.transparency.org/CPI

Table 1 shows that there has been no improvement in Nigeria’s position on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) since 1999. Indeed, within the period under review, (1999-2004), slid down the scale in some years, for instance, from 1.6 in 1999 to 1.2 in year 2000, and then to 1.0 in 2001. It moved up to 1.6 again in 2002, but slipped to 1.4 in 2003.

The note accompanying the publication by TI of its CPI, in 2004, provides the following information which is well-worth noting. First, the country with the lowest score on the CPI is not the world’s most corrupt country. The accurate interpretation is that it is the country that is perceived to be the most corrupt of those included in the index for that year. Second, it is the country’s score, not its serial placing on the index that is the important index of the perception of the level of corruption. Thus, the perception of Nigeria as not having improved on the level of corruption prevalent in the country in 1999, is far more important than that Nigeria is placed 144 or second (note, not third) to the last on the CPI of 2004. Third, it should be stressed that the methods and techniques used in the survey were not designed to favour any state, or was it biased against Nigeria in any way.

We may demonstrate that there is no anti-Nigeria bias in the CPI of TI of 2004, with yet another table. Table 2 below, shows the ten Third World countries with the highest scores on the 2004 CPI, and the ten with the lowest score, indicating the number of surveys on which the score of each was based. We should note that in terms of serial ranking Nigeria was not third from the bottom, but second. More important, in spite of the efforts of all of us, in and out of government, Nigeria still recorded the low point of 1.6, which she had in 1999 and 2002.

Nigeria, it should be pointed out, is not among the countries whose scores deteriorated most between 2003 and 2004. Those countries are Bahrain, Belize, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Kuwait Luxembourg, Mauritius, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Trinidad and Tobago. The African countries, which improved most, compared with last year were: Botswana, Gambia, Tanzania and Uganda. So did Nigeria, but only marginally.

Concerning the number of surveys used, it is to be noted that, in 2004, 18 surveys and expert assessments were used: three surveys, at the minimum, were required for a country to be included in the survey. For Nigeria, in 2004, nine surveys were used, higher than for many other Third World countries, including Botswana. Botswana, for which only four surveys were used, is the only African country to score above 5 points on the index, and thereby join the league of the highest countries, or those perceived as least corrupt.

As Nigerians, whether as members of the executive, legislative, judicial arms of the state, or as members of civil society, we should be seriously concerned about the perception of our country by these global respondents-business men, public officials, experts, living within Nigeria and abroad. We should, however, be even more worried about what members of Nigerian households think about the status of corruption in contemporary Nigeria.

Our own Federal Ministry of Finance commissioned a survey of Nigerian households in 2001. Researchers were drawn from a consortium of institutions. They interviewed respondents in Nigeria’s six geo-political zones and Abuja Federal Capital Territory.

Table 2. Ten Highest Scoring and Ten Lowest Scoring Third World Countries on the TI-CPI, 2004.

Serial Position (Rank)  Country  No. of Surveys Used  Score 
5 Singapore 13 9.3
16 Hong Kong 13 8.0
20 Chile 11 7.4
21 Barbados 3 7.3
25 Malta 4 6.8
28 Uruguay 6 6.2
29 Oman 5 6.1
29 United Arab Emirates 5 6.1
31 Botswana 4 6.0
35 Taiwan 15 5.6
133 Indonesia 14 2.0
133 Tajikistan 4 2.0
133 Turkmenistan 3 2.0
140 Azerbaijan 7 1.9
140 Paraquay 7 1.9
142 Chad 4 1.7
142 Mayanmar 4 1.7
144 Nigeria 9 1.6
145 Bangladesh 8 1.6
145 Haiti 5 1.5

Source: Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2004

The results of the survey conducted at the instance of the Federal Ministry of Finance are very interesting indeed. A proportion of the Nigerian households surveyed (60.8%) identified ‘corruption in the public sector’ as the major problem of development in Nigeria; only a slightly higher proportion (62.1%) identified another problem, namely ‘unemployment’ as the major problem. Eighty percent of the respondents assessed the state of corruption in Nigeria, in 2001 as ‘serious’. They were clear in their perception of the ‘very dishonest’ group of people, among Nigerians. Those identified as having very low integrity were the following: political parties (50%) of the respondents; members of the National Assembly (40%); members of the Federal and State Executive Councils and local government councils (38%) and local government councils (35%).

Of public service institutions, the Police was rated by 55.6 percent of the respondents as very dishonest, followed by Traffic Police (35.5%); NEPA (33.2%); Customs Department (25.1%); and Ministry of Justice/DPP (21.8%). Organizational believed, by the respondents to be ‘very honest’ were, first, religious organizations (33%); followed by NGOs (16%); and the mass media (16%).

Significantly, 65 percent of the Nigerian household respondents believed that, in 2001, there was more corruption than a year earlier. [Nigeria Government Corruption Study, June 2003:12]. This perception tallied with the CPI index on which Nigeria scored 1.2 in 2000 and 1.0 in 2001.

The result of the survey conducted by AFROBAROMETER in 2003 is rather ambiguous. The survey was on ‘popular attitudes toward democracy and markets’. It drew upon a representative random sample of Nigerians. Asked of their evaluation of the performance of the Nigerian Government, 64 percent of the respondents though that it performed ‘well’ in 2000 in respect of the fight against corruption; while only 48 percent though it did ‘well’ 2001. On ‘trust’ of the President, 90 percent said that they trusted him in 2000; and 82 percent declared their trust in him in 2001. How well then was the government handling corruption? Seventy-one percent of the respondents were satisfied that is was handling it ‘well’, while 43 percent believed that it was handling it badly. Yet 56 percent of the respondents perceived some officials of the Presidency as corrupt, while 34 percent though that ‘most/all’ were corrupt. (Ibid:55)

Why have Nigerians (Government, private sector and civil society) failed to reduce the level of corruption in Nigeria?

The Prelude of some Agenda: A SWOTS Analysis of Nigerians Civil Society.

Our focus will be on civil society; and our approach shall be the construction of a SWOT analysis of Nigerian civil society organizations. The analysis will enable us to highlight, not just the weaknesses of civil society and the obstacles on its way or threats to its existence, but also its strengths and the opportunities open to it which it has failed to utilize so far.

The Strength of Nigeria’s Civil Society

Civil society in Nigeria is strong and is likely to become more virile in future in spite of real and potent threats to its existence. Associational life is vibrant and trade union culture is embedded in the consciousness of Nigerians. Traditional civil society is therefore impregnable, but so far it has taken on marginal and episodic interest in the fight against corruption. It does not see corruption as the fundamental problem; it is rather preoccupied with the issue of exploitation.

Emergent civil society, the NGO wing, is growing too. Some of the NGOs are actually becoming transformed into action groups, targeting specific issues and problems. This trend is likely to continue for some time, especially if external funding which now feeds it is sustained.

Civil society in Nigeria is strengthened by some indirect legal ennoblement. The entire anti-corruption (public) watchdog, agencies operate on the assumption that individual members of civil society will, through petitions and complaints, trigger their, watch-dog mechanisms. What is left is recognition, in law, of civil society organization and groups as legitimate petitioners and the aggrieved.

Perhaps, the greatest strength of civil society lies in the existence of a vibrant press and a highly innovative set of electronic media, both radio and television. Within the limits of their resources and the constraints of the law, the Nigerian print media do get engaged in a measure of investigative journalism. This enables them to unearth quite a number of facts about corrupt practices. They are often aided by the developments in information communications technology websites, Internet facilities, electronic mail etc.

The development in the ICT world has also helped information (knowledge sharing and coalition building among like-minded non-governmental organizations with mutual interests and concerns.

There is no dearth of courageous persons and leaders within Nigeria’s civil society. With little effort, the philosophy of courageous assertiveness or constructive arrogance can be inculcated into the leadership of civil society. This character trait is, however, attenuated by the culture of crass materialism which pervades Nigerian state and society. It expresses itself in the all-consuming search for higher income (rent, profit, interest, wages), leaving otherwise well-meaning persons little time to spend on the fight against corruption.

The Weaknesses of Nigeria Civil Society.

In spite of its apparent strength, Nigeria’s civil society is beset by a number of inherent weaknesses. First it is fractionated by ethnicity, religion and differential impact of western education. In Nigeria, the vibrant NGO world is by and large a southerly-based phenomenon, with an orientation that is reflective of the western world view and interests that are shaped by the commercial, business, and political and religious organizations based in the south.

Most civil society proto political activities led by trade unions, for instance, take off much more easily and are better sustained in Lagos, Ibadan and one or two other towns in the South than in Kaduna, Sokoto or Maiduguri.

Nigeria’s civil society is also often fractionated by class differences. The working class, organized under the labour movement, easily mobilizes the unemployed and the under employed especially the lumpem proletariat. More difficult to bring into the fold are the peasantry. Often the strategy of the ruling class is to appear to the peasants and tell them that their interests are different and unique.

The large army of the unemployed in civil society constitutes both potential sources of strength and the Archilles hill of civil society, especially the trade union movement. The unemployed can be mobilized by the leadership of civil society for mass action against the state; but they can equally be approached by employers to serve as reservoir for recruitment to replace striking workers. For civil society, therefore, a large pool of unemployed is a double-edged sword.

The mass poverty of Nigerians coupled with their low level of education is the greatest source of weakness of civil society in activism. Absolute poverty when it exists side by side with stinking opulence generates a social condition characterized by both abject hopelessness and great expectations. Hopelessness breeds apathy; high expectations give birth to wishful thinking and pipe dreaming. Both dimensions of the social condition of the poor result in high level of tolerance for corruption. The hopeless may be willing to accept any aid no matter the source; the expectant turns a blind eye to the source of wealth, on the basis of the philosophy that the end justifies the means. It is in the sense that poverty is a bane to the fight against corruption.

There is also the factor of religion. Secularism encourages skepticism and an attitude of the acceptability of interrogation of the prevailing orthodoxy. Religiosity generates the mindset of accepting all things by faith. Its flip side is fatalism and, in some instances, superstition. Contemporary Nigeria is pre-eminently more religious than secular. This situation breeds its own corruption; but more important reduces the circle of people from which civil society organization can recruit its anti-graft army. At the same time, a religious society is more likely, than a secular society, to be or develop into a moral society. Therefore there are as much opportunities in the religious nature of Nigerian society as obstacles.

Opportunities for Civil Society Engagement.

Civil society in Nigeria has never had, and in the distant future, is unlikely to have, as robust combination of opportunities, as it is currently basking in. Nigeria is in a historical conjuncture marked by the alienation of the masses of the people from the state, and the search for a liberator from civil society. We are in a post-decolonization, post-cold war ear, which has thrown up its own historic challenges: the global concern for democracy and development, with a strong anti corruption component.

There is also the global, new imperialist fear of opposition parties, with their tendency to degenerate into armed rebellion. This has led to the invention of a diversion, non-partisan, monitoring and capacity building-oriented non-governmental organizations. They are encouraged to thrive and advocate, seldom to act and oppose. It is a world of political eunuchs, harmless to the domestic and external wings of the ruling class. But donors’ funds are assured, provided the sharp weapons of radicalism, directed at repressive states and exploiting multi-nationals are blunted, redirected to the realm of rhetorics. Talk the talk, (not act the act) is the injunction.

The global-induced opportunity for anti-corruption wars is strengthened by the wide gap in the government’s anti-corruption policy. First, there is a policy without a programme. There is good intention sans a comprehensive action plan to combat both corruption and poverty. Consequently, governments anti-corruption pursuits, there is palpable tension between precepts and practices; between rhetorics and reality; between lofty official declarations of intent and lowly official operational behaviour. High level public officials hide under constitutional technicality or immunity to shirk their constitutional obligation of declaration of assets, but encourage the Code of Conduct Bureau to hound low and middle level civil servants for failing to declare their own. High political office holders flaunt their business companies and commercially oriented universities in the face of all and sundry, but still preach the message of respecting the constitutional injunction against indulgence in acts of conflict of interest.

Civil society organizations should see this hypocrisy, not as an obstacle, but as an opportunity and a challenge. The challenge is to courageously expose every hypocrite, no matter how highly placed. The opportunity is to show that, in Nigeria, things can be done differently; that a genuine war against corruption can be waged.

Even the prevalence of prebendal politics can be transformed from a threat to the anti-corruption struggle into an opportunity. Politics as a game of patron-client relationships bonded with cash nexus, or as an investment made in the expectation of material returns creates a difficult terrain for the war against graft. It is a phenomenon that touches at the very heart of graft, namely corruption in party and election financing and candidate funding, cash-backed by buccaneer businessmen. It introduces heavy dose of violence into the political process and makes the war against corruption a deadly venture. But the greater the challenge the greater the opportunity to show courage; the greater the need to have a few persons determined to save the people from neo-feudal serfdom. It is in this sense that the Anambra State types and Osun State type prebendal politics provides an opportunity for anti-corruption crusaders.

The Obstacles Threats to Civil Society Engagement
We must not make light of the obstacles, however, but we must not dwell too long on them, lest they discourage and cripple us. Constitutional immunity against prosecution in the law courts of the President, Vice President, Governors of a state, Deputy Governor of a state is a hindrance. But it can be removed politically, even when it is a legal obstacle. Same for the excuse that, the constitution does not provide for public declaration of assets by public officers. A proper contextual reading of the law shows that that was the intention of those who drafted it. This too can be handled politically.

Two other obstacles, which are legal but can be handled politically are the lack of legal protection for whistle blowers and the absence of an access to freedom of information act. Through skillful coalition building and other strategies in the agenda for civil society such obstacles would be overcome.

The Strategies; Agenda for Civil Society
The core of the agenda for civil society in the war against graft is the formulation of a comprehensive action plan for the nation. There is the need to convoke a conference of representatives of stakeholders to work out an integrated plan with three components: participatory democracy; pro-poor development; transparency and accountability. The component of the plan, dealing with transparency and accountability will include, but shall not be limited to the following:

• Agenda for CSO cooperation in building research based knowledge and information about types of corruption, incidence, spread, and consequences.
• Agenda for rationalization and coordination of the programmes and actions of all public anti-corruption/pro-transparency accountability/pro-administrative justice institutions.
• Agenda for CSO collaboration in the removal of fear, and the building of unity and strength.
• Agenda for the establishment of connections between CSOs and their own communities, building of grassroots base, being openly accountable (in the financial, political and representational senses) to own communities and members.
• Agenda for building a coalition of CSO peers across Africa, as well as strengthening international coalitions.
• Agenda for the application of the amnesty international strategy to extremely sensitive cases.
• Agenda for building up independent sources of funds (domestic and external) – eg a national endowment fund for the war against graft, placed under a board of trustees.
• Agenda for within – border and cross-border cooperation (CSO-CSO) in exposing corrupt practices and corrupt person s and groups/organizations.
• Agenda for devising a variety of new tools for achieving transparency/combating corruption; e.g m.o.u.s/integrity pacts; school-age children organization
• Agenda for more comprehensive, home based, but internationally acceptable, assessments of sate of corruption and impact of the fight against it.

• Agenda for recognition of and rewards for outstanding achievement in the crusade for transparency/accountability and the war against corruption.
• Agenda for making historic dates and events connected with the global and national history of the fight against corruption.
• Agenda for mass mobilization of Nigeria in the rural communities in the search for transparency/accountability and the war against graft.

Conclusion
From the perspective of civil society, the war against graft in Nigeria is yet to begin. It will begin the day CSOS plan their own programmes, source their own funds, and take the initiative in executing such programmes. It will start when CSOs can muster enough strength to compel the president, any one of them at any time, the governors of states and deputy governors of states, to shed their pretence or immunity and declare their assets publicly and subject themselves to the same kind of probe as anyone else. The war will start when civil society forces the same people, as well as all legislators, to make known to Nigerians the sources of the wealth. It will start when CSOS are able to achieve the recall of a single legislator or the resignation of a sole minister, commissioner, local government chairman, on the charge of corrupt practices. More important it will start when we are able to avert a single act of intended graft and help to create a zero-corruption-tolerant society. There are actions within the realm of possibility of CSOS. At present, we are caught in a merry-go-round of workshops, conferences, summits, interactive sessions, or “hot lines” and monitoring of what government is doing, CSOS of the NGO types are in danger of merely becoming agents of the state and extensions of state programmes.

To become true CSOS, we should develop a national action plan for the fight against corruption. Then we can seize the initiative from government. Then we can shift emphasis from the selective to the comprehensive, from the negative to the positive, from the curative to the preventive. CSOS hope that the national assembly is ready for the new war.


 
All Content ©2005. Center For The Development Of Civil Society. All rights reserved. Powered by: ...