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Articles
Anti-Graft
War in Nigeria: An Agenda for Civil Society.
Dr.
H. Assis Asobie
President, Transparency in Nigeria TIN.
December
9 2004, TIN in collaboration with the Global Rights and the Convention
on Business Integrity marked the UN Day on Anti-Corruption with
a symposium on: “The State of the Fight against Corruption
in Nigeria Today”. Assisi Asobie used the opportunity to respond
to a Nigeria Government that holds the view that TI Corruption Perception
Index is anti Nigeria. He also used the opportunity to set agenda
for civil society. The following are excerpts from his presentation
at the event.
An
Assessment of the Fight Against Corruption in Nigeria, 1999-2004.
To encourage reform and point out the right direction, TI conducts
a number of surveys. Two of these surveys are very popular yet widely
misinterpreted and misunderstood. They are the Corruption Perception
Index (measuring perception about bribe takers) and the Bribe Payers
Index. We shall carefully explain the nature of these surveys and
what really they are meant to measure.
Political
leaders, public officers, the private sector and non-governmental
organizations have spent a lot of time, energy and resources in
trying to eradicate the deadly disease of corruption in Nigeria
since 1999; but the efforts have yielded little results. This is
evident in the outcome of a number of surveys conducted by various
organizations. We may begin with the Corruption Perception Index
of TI. Table 1 below, presents the result of the surveys for Nigerian,
between 1999 and 2004.
Table
1. Nigeria’s Position on the CPI, 1999-2004
| Year |
CPI
scale |
No.
of states sampled |
No.
of surveys |
CPI
Score |
| 1999 |
10-0 |
99 |
5 |
1.6 |
| 2000 |
10-0 |
n.a |
4 |
1.2 |
| 2001 |
10-0 |
91 |
4 |
1.0 |
| 2002 |
10-0 |
n.a |
6 |
1.6 |
| 2003 |
10-0 |
133 |
9 |
1.4 |
| 2004 |
10-0 |
146 |
9 |
1.6 |
Source:
Research conducted by a Ph.D. student of the University of Nigeria,
Nsukka, Mr. Malachy Eze, in 2004, based on data obtained from http:www.transparency.org/CPI
Table
1 shows that there has been no improvement in Nigeria’s position
on TI’s Corruption Perception Index (CPI) since 1999. Indeed,
within the period under review, (1999-2004), slid down the scale
in some years, for instance, from 1.6 in 1999 to 1.2 in year 2000,
and then to 1.0 in 2001. It moved up to 1.6 again in 2002, but slipped
to 1.4 in 2003.
The
note accompanying the publication by TI of its CPI, in 2004, provides
the following information which is well-worth noting. First, the
country with the lowest score on the CPI is not the world’s
most corrupt country. The accurate interpretation is that it is
the country that is perceived to be the most corrupt of those included
in the index for that year. Second, it is the country’s score,
not its serial placing on the index that is the important index
of the perception of the level of corruption. Thus, the perception
of Nigeria as not having improved on the level of corruption prevalent
in the country in 1999, is far more important than that Nigeria
is placed 144 or second (note, not third) to the last on the CPI
of 2004. Third, it should be stressed that the methods and techniques
used in the survey were not designed to favour any state, or was
it biased against Nigeria in any way.
We
may demonstrate that there is no anti-Nigeria bias in the CPI of
TI of 2004, with yet another table. Table 2 below, shows the ten
Third World countries with the highest scores on the 2004 CPI, and
the ten with the lowest score, indicating the number of surveys
on which the score of each was based. We should note that in terms
of serial ranking Nigeria was not third from the bottom, but second.
More important, in spite of the efforts of all of us, in and out
of government, Nigeria still recorded the low point of 1.6, which
she had in 1999 and 2002.
Nigeria,
it should be pointed out, is not among the countries whose scores
deteriorated most between 2003 and 2004. Those countries are Bahrain,
Belize, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, Jamaica, Kuwait Luxembourg,
Mauritius, Oman, Poland, Saudi Arabia, Senegal and Trinidad and
Tobago. The African countries, which improved most, compared with
last year were: Botswana, Gambia, Tanzania and Uganda. So did Nigeria,
but only marginally.
Concerning
the number of surveys used, it is to be noted that, in 2004, 18
surveys and expert assessments were used: three surveys, at the
minimum, were required for a country to be included in the survey.
For Nigeria, in 2004, nine surveys were used, higher than for many
other Third World countries, including Botswana. Botswana, for which
only four surveys were used, is the only African country to score
above 5 points on the index, and thereby join the league of the
highest countries, or those perceived as least corrupt.
As
Nigerians, whether as members of the executive, legislative, judicial
arms of the state, or as members of civil society, we should be
seriously concerned about the perception of our country by these
global respondents-business men, public officials, experts, living
within Nigeria and abroad. We should, however, be even more worried
about what members of Nigerian households think about the status
of corruption in contemporary Nigeria.
Our
own Federal Ministry of Finance commissioned a survey of Nigerian
households in 2001. Researchers were drawn from a consortium of
institutions. They interviewed respondents in Nigeria’s six
geo-political zones and Abuja Federal Capital Territory.
Table
2. Ten Highest Scoring and Ten Lowest Scoring Third World Countries
on the TI-CPI, 2004.
| Serial
Position (Rank) |
Country |
No.
of Surveys Used |
Score |
| 5 |
Singapore |
13 |
9.3 |
| 16 |
Hong
Kong |
13 |
8.0 |
| 20 |
Chile |
11 |
7.4 |
| 21 |
Barbados |
3 |
7.3 |
| 25 |
Malta |
4 |
6.8 |
| 28 |
Uruguay |
6 |
6.2 |
| 29 |
Oman |
5 |
6.1 |
| 29 |
United
Arab Emirates |
5 |
6.1 |
| 31 |
Botswana |
4 |
6.0 |
| 35 |
Taiwan |
15 |
5.6 |
| 133 |
Indonesia |
14 |
2.0 |
| 133 |
Tajikistan |
4 |
2.0 |
| 133 |
Turkmenistan |
3 |
2.0 |
| 140 |
Azerbaijan |
7 |
1.9 |
| 140 |
Paraquay |
7 |
1.9 |
| 142 |
Chad |
4 |
1.7 |
| 142 |
Mayanmar |
4 |
1.7 |
| 144 |
Nigeria |
9 |
1.6 |
| 145 |
Bangladesh |
8 |
1.6 |
| 145 |
Haiti |
5 |
1.5 |
Source:
Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index, 2004
The
results of the survey conducted at the instance of the Federal Ministry
of Finance are very interesting indeed. A proportion of the Nigerian
households surveyed (60.8%) identified ‘corruption in the
public sector’ as the major problem of development in Nigeria;
only a slightly higher proportion (62.1%) identified another problem,
namely ‘unemployment’ as the major problem. Eighty percent
of the respondents assessed the state of corruption in Nigeria,
in 2001 as ‘serious’. They were clear in their perception
of the ‘very dishonest’ group of people, among Nigerians.
Those identified as having very low integrity were the following:
political parties (50%) of the respondents; members of the National
Assembly (40%); members of the Federal and State Executive Councils
and local government councils (38%) and local government councils
(35%).
Of
public service institutions, the Police was rated by 55.6 percent
of the respondents as very dishonest, followed by Traffic Police
(35.5%); NEPA (33.2%); Customs Department (25.1%); and Ministry
of Justice/DPP (21.8%). Organizational believed, by the respondents
to be ‘very honest’ were, first, religious organizations
(33%); followed by NGOs (16%); and the mass media (16%).
Significantly,
65 percent of the Nigerian household respondents believed that,
in 2001, there was more corruption than a year earlier. [Nigeria
Government Corruption Study, June 2003:12]. This perception tallied
with the CPI index on which Nigeria scored 1.2 in 2000 and 1.0 in
2001.
The
result of the survey conducted by AFROBAROMETER in 2003 is rather
ambiguous. The survey was on ‘popular attitudes toward democracy
and markets’. It drew upon a representative random sample
of Nigerians. Asked of their evaluation of the performance of the
Nigerian Government, 64 percent of the respondents though that it
performed ‘well’ in 2000 in respect of the fight against
corruption; while only 48 percent though it did ‘well’
2001. On ‘trust’ of the President, 90 percent said that
they trusted him in 2000; and 82 percent declared their trust in
him in 2001. How well then was the government handling corruption?
Seventy-one percent of the respondents were satisfied that is was
handling it ‘well’, while 43 percent believed that it
was handling it badly. Yet 56 percent of the respondents perceived
some officials of the Presidency as corrupt, while 34 percent though
that ‘most/all’ were corrupt. (Ibid:55)
Why
have Nigerians (Government, private sector and civil society) failed
to reduce the level of corruption in Nigeria?
The
Prelude of some Agenda: A SWOTS Analysis of Nigerians Civil Society.
Our
focus will be on civil society; and our approach shall be the construction
of a SWOT analysis of Nigerian civil society organizations. The
analysis will enable us to highlight, not just the weaknesses of
civil society and the obstacles on its way or threats to its existence,
but also its strengths and the opportunities open to it which it
has failed to utilize so far.
The
Strength of Nigeria’s Civil Society
Civil
society in Nigeria is strong and is likely to become more virile
in future in spite of real and potent threats to its existence.
Associational life is vibrant and trade union culture is embedded
in the consciousness of Nigerians. Traditional civil society is
therefore impregnable, but so far it has taken on marginal and episodic
interest in the fight against corruption. It does not see corruption
as the fundamental problem; it is rather preoccupied with the issue
of exploitation.
Emergent
civil society, the NGO wing, is growing too. Some of the NGOs are
actually becoming transformed into action groups, targeting specific
issues and problems. This trend is likely to continue for some time,
especially if external funding which now feeds it is sustained.
Civil
society in Nigeria is strengthened by some indirect legal ennoblement.
The entire anti-corruption (public) watchdog, agencies operate on
the assumption that individual members of civil society will, through
petitions and complaints, trigger their, watch-dog mechanisms. What
is left is recognition, in law, of civil society organization and
groups as legitimate petitioners and the aggrieved.
Perhaps,
the greatest strength of civil society lies in the existence of
a vibrant press and a highly innovative set of electronic media,
both radio and television. Within the limits of their resources
and the constraints of the law, the Nigerian print media do get
engaged in a measure of investigative journalism. This enables them
to unearth quite a number of facts about corrupt practices. They
are often aided by the developments in information communications
technology websites, Internet facilities, electronic mail etc.
The
development in the ICT world has also helped information (knowledge
sharing and coalition building among like-minded non-governmental
organizations with mutual interests and concerns.
There
is no dearth of courageous persons and leaders within Nigeria’s
civil society. With little effort, the philosophy of courageous
assertiveness or constructive arrogance can be inculcated into the
leadership of civil society. This character trait is, however, attenuated
by the culture of crass materialism which pervades Nigerian state
and society. It expresses itself in the all-consuming search for
higher income (rent, profit, interest, wages), leaving otherwise
well-meaning persons little time to spend on the fight against corruption.
The Weaknesses of Nigeria Civil Society.
In
spite of its apparent strength, Nigeria’s civil society is
beset by a number of inherent weaknesses. First it is fractionated
by ethnicity, religion and differential impact of western education.
In Nigeria, the vibrant NGO world is by and large a southerly-based
phenomenon, with an orientation that is reflective of the western
world view and interests that are shaped by the commercial, business,
and political and religious organizations based in the south.
Most
civil society proto political activities led by trade unions, for
instance, take off much more easily and are better sustained in
Lagos, Ibadan and one or two other towns in the South than in Kaduna,
Sokoto or Maiduguri.
Nigeria’s
civil society is also often fractionated by class differences. The
working class, organized under the labour movement, easily mobilizes
the unemployed and the under employed especially the lumpem proletariat.
More difficult to bring into the fold are the peasantry. Often the
strategy of the ruling class is to appear to the peasants and tell
them that their interests are different and unique.
The
large army of the unemployed in civil society constitutes both potential
sources of strength and the Archilles hill of civil society, especially
the trade union movement. The unemployed can be mobilized by the
leadership of civil society for mass action against the state; but
they can equally be approached by employers to serve as reservoir
for recruitment to replace striking workers. For civil society,
therefore, a large pool of unemployed is a double-edged sword.
The
mass poverty of Nigerians coupled with their low level of education
is the greatest source of weakness of civil society in activism.
Absolute poverty when it exists side by side with stinking opulence
generates a social condition characterized by both abject hopelessness
and great expectations. Hopelessness breeds apathy; high expectations
give birth to wishful thinking and pipe dreaming. Both dimensions
of the social condition of the poor result in high level of tolerance
for corruption. The hopeless may be willing to accept any aid no
matter the source; the expectant turns a blind eye to the source
of wealth, on the basis of the philosophy that the end justifies
the means. It is in the sense that poverty is a bane to the fight
against corruption.
There
is also the factor of religion. Secularism encourages skepticism
and an attitude of the acceptability of interrogation of the prevailing
orthodoxy. Religiosity generates the mindset of accepting all things
by faith. Its flip side is fatalism and, in some instances, superstition.
Contemporary Nigeria is pre-eminently more religious than secular.
This situation breeds its own corruption; but more important reduces
the circle of people from which civil society organization can recruit
its anti-graft army. At the same time, a religious society is more
likely, than a secular society, to be or develop into a moral society.
Therefore there are as much opportunities in the religious nature
of Nigerian society as obstacles.
Opportunities
for Civil Society Engagement.
Civil
society in Nigeria has never had, and in the distant future, is
unlikely to have, as robust combination of opportunities, as it
is currently basking in. Nigeria is in a historical conjuncture
marked by the alienation of the masses of the people from the state,
and the search for a liberator from civil society. We are in a post-decolonization,
post-cold war ear, which has thrown up its own historic challenges:
the global concern for democracy and development, with a strong
anti corruption component.
There
is also the global, new imperialist fear of opposition parties,
with their tendency to degenerate into armed rebellion. This has
led to the invention of a diversion, non-partisan, monitoring and
capacity building-oriented non-governmental organizations. They
are encouraged to thrive and advocate, seldom to act and oppose.
It is a world of political eunuchs, harmless to the domestic and
external wings of the ruling class. But donors’ funds are
assured, provided the sharp weapons of radicalism, directed at repressive
states and exploiting multi-nationals are blunted, redirected to
the realm of rhetorics. Talk the talk, (not act the act) is the
injunction.
The
global-induced opportunity for anti-corruption wars is strengthened
by the wide gap in the government’s anti-corruption policy.
First, there is a policy without a programme. There is good intention
sans a comprehensive action plan to combat both corruption and poverty.
Consequently, governments anti-corruption pursuits, there is palpable
tension between precepts and practices; between rhetorics and reality;
between lofty official declarations of intent and lowly official
operational behaviour. High level public officials hide under constitutional
technicality or immunity to shirk their constitutional obligation
of declaration of assets, but encourage the Code of Conduct Bureau
to hound low and middle level civil servants for failing to declare
their own. High political office holders flaunt their business companies
and commercially oriented universities in the face of all and sundry,
but still preach the message of respecting the constitutional injunction
against indulgence in acts of conflict of interest.
Civil
society organizations should see this hypocrisy, not as an obstacle,
but as an opportunity and a challenge. The challenge is to courageously
expose every hypocrite, no matter how highly placed. The opportunity
is to show that, in Nigeria, things can be done differently; that
a genuine war against corruption can be waged.
Even
the prevalence of prebendal politics can be transformed from a threat
to the anti-corruption struggle into an opportunity. Politics as
a game of patron-client relationships bonded with cash nexus, or
as an investment made in the expectation of material returns creates
a difficult terrain for the war against graft. It is a phenomenon
that touches at the very heart of graft, namely corruption in party
and election financing and candidate funding, cash-backed by buccaneer
businessmen. It introduces heavy dose of violence into the political
process and makes the war against corruption a deadly venture. But
the greater the challenge the greater the opportunity to show courage;
the greater the need to have a few persons determined to save the
people from neo-feudal serfdom. It is in this sense that the Anambra
State types and Osun State type prebendal politics provides an opportunity
for anti-corruption crusaders.
The
Obstacles Threats to Civil Society Engagement
We must not make light of the obstacles, however, but we must not
dwell too long on them, lest they discourage and cripple us. Constitutional
immunity against prosecution in the law courts of the President,
Vice President, Governors of a state, Deputy Governor of a state
is a hindrance. But it can be removed politically, even when it
is a legal obstacle. Same for the excuse that, the constitution
does not provide for public declaration of assets by public officers.
A proper contextual reading of the law shows that that was the intention
of those who drafted it. This too can be handled politically.
Two
other obstacles, which are legal but can be handled politically
are the lack of legal protection for whistle blowers and the absence
of an access to freedom of information act. Through skillful coalition
building and other strategies in the agenda for civil society such
obstacles would be overcome.
The
Strategies; Agenda for Civil Society
The core of the agenda for civil society in the war against graft
is the formulation of a comprehensive action plan for the nation.
There is the need to convoke a conference of representatives of
stakeholders to work out an integrated plan with three components:
participatory democracy; pro-poor development; transparency and
accountability. The component of the plan, dealing with transparency
and accountability will include, but shall not be limited to the
following:
•
Agenda for CSO cooperation in building research based knowledge
and information about types of corruption, incidence, spread, and
consequences.
• Agenda for rationalization and coordination of the programmes
and actions of all public anti-corruption/pro-transparency accountability/pro-administrative
justice institutions.
• Agenda for CSO collaboration in the removal of fear, and
the building of unity and strength.
• Agenda for the establishment of connections between CSOs
and their own communities, building of grassroots base, being openly
accountable (in the financial, political and representational senses)
to own communities and members.
• Agenda for building a coalition of CSO peers across Africa,
as well as strengthening international coalitions.
• Agenda for the application of the amnesty international
strategy to extremely sensitive cases.
• Agenda for building up independent sources of funds (domestic
and external) – eg a national endowment fund for the war against
graft, placed under a board of trustees.
• Agenda for within – border and cross-border cooperation
(CSO-CSO) in exposing corrupt practices and corrupt person s and
groups/organizations.
• Agenda for devising a variety of new tools for achieving
transparency/combating corruption; e.g m.o.u.s/integrity pacts;
school-age children organization
• Agenda for more comprehensive, home based, but internationally
acceptable, assessments of sate of corruption and impact of the
fight against it.
•
Agenda for recognition of and rewards for outstanding achievement
in the crusade for transparency/accountability and the war against
corruption.
• Agenda for making historic dates and events connected with
the global and national history of the fight against corruption.
• Agenda for mass mobilization of Nigeria in the rural communities
in the search for transparency/accountability and the war against
graft.
Conclusion
From the perspective of civil society, the war against graft in
Nigeria is yet to begin. It will begin the day CSOS plan their own
programmes, source their own funds, and take the initiative in executing
such programmes. It will start when CSOs can muster enough strength
to compel the president, any one of them at any time, the governors
of states and deputy governors of states, to shed their pretence
or immunity and declare their assets publicly and subject themselves
to the same kind of probe as anyone else. The war will start when
civil society forces the same people, as well as all legislators,
to make known to Nigerians the sources of the wealth. It will start
when CSOS are able to achieve the recall of a single legislator
or the resignation of a sole minister, commissioner, local government
chairman, on the charge of corrupt practices. More important it
will start when we are able to avert a single act of intended graft
and help to create a zero-corruption-tolerant society. There are
actions within the realm of possibility of CSOS. At present, we
are caught in a merry-go-round of workshops, conferences, summits,
interactive sessions, or “hot lines” and monitoring
of what government is doing, CSOS of the NGO types are in danger
of merely becoming agents of the state and extensions of state programmes.
To
become true CSOS, we should develop a national action plan for the
fight against corruption. Then we can seize the initiative from
government. Then we can shift emphasis from the selective to the
comprehensive, from the negative to the positive, from the curative
to the preventive. CSOS hope that the national assembly is ready
for the new war.

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